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ITH SPEED AND ingenuity worthy of any of the hottest
dot-com companies, commercial banks are staking out 
positions on the Internet—ground zero in the 21st century
battle for market share. While true Internet banks are cap-
turing attention for their radical business strategies, com-
munity banks, often acting collectively, are quickly carving
out their own online niches to attract business and strengthen cus-
tomer relationships. The big banks have the most ambitious agendas,
attempting to overtake nonbank competitors that early on established
a strong presence in online financial services. Based on the data
available, Eleventh District banks have been as aggressive as similarly
sized banks nationwide in pursuing an Internet presence.
As with most electronic commerce ventures, the revenues are still
small. Moreover, the risks inherent in Internet-based electronic payment
systems are considerable. But the current spate of product innovations
could yield the next killer application, and many more technological
advances are on the horizon. For banks that manage to grab a share
of the burgeoning market, the profit potential may be enormous.
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‘NETINTEREST’ GROWSAS
BANKSRUSHONLINEThe True Internet Banks
The Office of Thrift Supervision ap-
proved the first all-Internet charter, for
Security First Network Bank, in 1995.
The first national charter approved for
an electronic bank was given to Hous-
ton-based CompuBank, N.A. in August
1997. Initially, CompuBank did not offer
banking transactions over the Internet,
but added that feature later. By year-
end 1999, nine cyberbanks were in ex-
istence. Their business strategy hinges
on keeping capital expenditures low by
not operating physical branch offices.
Customers transact with the bank using
a personal computer and a secure Web
browser—software that encrypts infor-
mation sent over the Internet—ATMs,
mail, telephone and fax. In most in-
stances, Internet banks strive to under-
price their conventional competitors on
fees and pay higher interest rates on 
deposits.
As is typical in the e-commerce econ-
omy, few of these fledgling entities
have achieved consistent and sustained
growth and profitability. Yet some have
already attracted suitors. In 1998, Royal
Bank of Canada purchased Security First
Network Bank as a vehicle for expand-
ing its market share in the United States.
In January, E-Trade Group Inc. received
regulatory approval to acquire Telebanc
Financial Corp. in what was the first
merger of an online brokerage and an
online thrift institution. The resulting
entity offers single log-on for brokerage
and bank accounts, as well as a web
page with consolidated account infor-
mation.
Online Strategies
With similar celerity, traditional
bricks-and-mortar banks are adopting
the Internet as an auxiliary distribution
channel. Federal banking regulatory
agencies report that more than 3,500
banks and thrifts operated web sites at
year-end 1999, and new sites are going
live daily. These banks are employing
various online strategies, which bank-
ing regulators classify into three broad
categories.
The most basic are informational, or
Level 1, web sites, which serve as mar-
keting tools. They convey publicly
available information, such as loan or
deposit interest rates and product infor-
mation, and may allow customers to
send nonsensitive electronic mail, such
as a request for a brochure. These sites
may also allow the bank to collect data
about visitors to refine sales and mar-
keting efforts.
More sophisticated web sites allow
for interactive confidential information
transfers between users and financial 
institutions. Known as Level 2, or com-
municative, web sites, they allow data
or file uploads or downloads, enabling
customers to make inquiries about their
accounts, for example, or submit loan
or deposit account applications.
The most complex web sites are
Level 3, or transactional, information
systems, which allow customers to make
real-time queries about accounts, up-
date account information, transfer
funds, pay bills and make other transac-
tions. As the technology becomes
cheaper and more reliable, transactional
banking web sites, once the domain of
the largest banks, are proliferating.
Based on interviews with vendors, the
Comptroller of the Currency estimates
that over 90 percent of new banking
web sites will be fully transactional.
1 As
of June 30, 1998, there were 223 trans-
actional bank web sites, based on infor-
mation collected informally by the
banking regulatory authorities. By year-
end 1999, roughly 1,121, or about one-
third of bank and thrift web sites, had
transactional capabilities. Add credit
unions to the number and the total rises
to 2,100 transactional sites nationwide.
The attraction for financial institu-
tions is clear. The cost of an Internet
banking transaction is an estimated 1
cent, compared with $1.14 per transac-
tion by teller, 55 cents by phone, 29
cents by ATM and 2 cents by proprietary
computer system.
2
The Mouse That Roared
Little hard data about banking web
sites exist, and most of the information
gathered thus far has resulted from in-
formal monitoring by banking regula-
tors. However, beginning in June 1999,
domestic insured commercial banks were
required to report the primary Internet
web address of their home page on the
quarterly Reports of Condition and In-
come, also known as call reports, that
they file with the federal banking agen-
cies. Because banks only recently
began reporting this information, these
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Internet banking is emerging as more
than a means of putting existing ser-
vices online. Innovative partnerships and
strategic alliances have provided many
revenue-generating opportunities. Some
bank web sites have bundled informa-
tion and services in useful ways to cre-
ate a sort of electronic resource center or
virtual mall with links to other services
and vendors. By positioning their web
sites as an access point to a range of
service offerings outside their traditional
lines of business, banks are generating
new fee income from advertising, refer-
rals and commissions from their web
partners.
Some financial institutions are mak-
ing use of “screen-scraper” technology,
which aggregates account data from
various web sites with customer per-
mission. The web site then becomes a
portal for all of a customer’s financial
transactions. One banking web site, ex-
pected to be launched in April, will use
screen scraping to assemble all of a cus-
tomer’s financial holdings onto one web
page, including stocks, mutual funds, 
e-mail, credit cards and other account-
related information. The site will also
provide  “virtual personal assistants,”
which can help with personal chores,
shopping, travel services, news, calen-
dars and personal-organizer tasks.
A much-anticipated new service is
web data are subject to considerable
error. Based on the call reports, Chart 1
depicts the proportion of banks with
web sites as of year-end 1999. The
Boston and Philadelphia Federal Reserve
Districts had the highest proportions of
banks with web sites, at 58 percent and
57 percent, respectively. The Kansas City
and Minneapolis Districts had the low-
est proportions, with about 28 percent
of the banks in both districts reporting a
web presence. In the Dallas District, 33
percent of banks had web sites, which
was just below the nationwide figure of
36 percent.
In Chart 2, the banks are divided by
asset size into eight equal groups, with
the smallest banks in Group 1 and the
largest in Group 8. The chart shows that
the larger banks are more likely than
the smaller banks to have web sites.
Further, Eleventh District banks closely
follow the trend exhibited by banks na-
tionwide. Of the largest banks, 68 per-
cent nationwide and 76 percent within
the District have web sites. Conversely,
among the smallest banks, 14 percent
nationwide and 13 percent in the Elev-
enth District are on the web.
Charts 3 and 4 show the differences
between urban and rural banks with re-
gard to Internet activity. In Chart 3, U.S.
banks are divided by asset size and lo-
cation. Among both urban and rural
banks, the larger banks were more
likely than the smaller banks to have
web sites. Further, among the smaller
banks, urban banks were far more
likely than rural banks to have web
sites. In Group 1, which represents the
smallest banks, 29 percent of the urban
banks reported having web sites, com-
pared with just 8 percent of the rural
banks. Similarly, in Group 2, 27 percent
of the urban banks had web sites, more
than double the 13 percent of rural
banks. In contrast, at the other end of
the size spectrum, the proportion of
rural banks on the Internet equaled or
even exceeded the proportion of urban
banks with web sites.
Eleventh District banks exhibit a pat-
tern nearly identical to banks nation-
wide, with the smaller urban banks
being more aggressive than smaller
rural banks on the World Wide Web
(Chart 4 ). In Group 1, 26 percent of
urban banks and 8 percent of rural
banks had web sites. In Group 2, 24
percent of urban banks and 14 percent
of rural banks had sites. Within the Dis-
trict, the larger rural banks have gone
online in similar proportions to their
urban counterparts.
Informal monitoring by Dallas Fed
banking supervision staff indicates that
more than half of state member banks
in the Eleventh District maintained web
sites as of year-end 1999. Of these sites,
18 percent were informational, 27 per-
cent were communicative and 55 per-
cent were fully transactional.
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do for the banking industry what online
trading did for the brokerage industry.
Bill presentment technology consoli-
dates a customer’s bills on one web site
to allow the review of detailed invoices
online. A few banks already offer bill
presentment, which requires them to
enter into networks with billers, such as
utilities; others are in the testing stage.
More than 15 million households are
expected to receive their bills online by
2002, according to Jupiter Communica-
tions, a technology consulting firm.
3 As
such, bill presentment offers a huge
marketing opportunity for banks to gain
insights into customers’ buying habits,
payment records and risk profiles.
Mixed Consumer Response
The banking industry has long em-
braced the concept of electronic finan-
cial transactions, having pioneered such
services as telephone banking and dial-
up personal computer banking. Con-
sumers have developed a high degree
of comfort for using remote basic bank-
ing services, as demonstrated by the
rapid proliferation of ATMs since their
introduction 30 years ago.
The public is quickly becoming In-
ternet-savvy. Already more than half of
all U.S. households have at least one
personal computer, up from about one-
third in 1997. A Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers survey found 43 percent of
computer owners were connected to
the Internet in 1999, up 50 percent from
1998.
4
One of the primary uses for personal
computers is to research financial infor-
mation. However, widespread consumer
acceptance of Internet banking has yet
to be achieved. Only a small proportion
of banking customers—6.6 million
households—had online banking ac-
counts in 1998, according to Interna-
tional Data Corp., a technology consult-
ing group.
5
A big hurdle for banks is that con-
sumer confidence is shaky. One market
study, conducted in August 1999 by
Jupiter Communications, found that 64
percent of online consumers are un-
likely to trust a web site, even if it
prominently displays a privacy policy.
6
Other industry studies have concluded
that security concerns are a primary rea-
son online users have not made a pur-
chase.
Security risk—the potential for un-
authorized access to networks, systems
and databases—is inherent in elec-
tronic delivery channels. Consistent 
use of a range of technologies and 
procedures is essential to safeguard
data. The major approaches include se-
cure web servers separated by firewalls
from general-purpose web servers; data
encryption and digital signatures to 
ensure data integrity and authenticate
users; and controls such as passwords
and PINs, along with technologies 
such as tokens, smart cards and bio-
metrics.
Federal consumer protection regula-
tions provide an added safety net for 
Internet banking customers.
7 Many of
the general principles, requirements and
controls within the current consumer
protection regulatory framework apply
to financial services conducted electron-
ically. For example, the Fair Credit Billing
Act (FCBA) and Electronic Fund Trans-
fer Act (EFTA) establish procedures for
resolving errors on credit account and
bank account statements, respectively.
Credit transactions are covered under
the FCBA, which is implemented by
Regulation Z. The regulation limits the
cardholder’s liability for unauthorized
use to $50. The EFTA is implemented by
Regulation E, which limits consumer li-
ability for unauthorized transactions to
a maximum of $500. Prompt notification
of an unauthorized transaction or the
loss or theft of an access device could
substantially reduce any consumer lia-
bility. Both regulations specify initial
and periodic statement disclosure re-
quirements.
The Cookie Monster
Another critical issue is privacy,
which refers to the collection and shar-
ing of customer information. The levels
of privacy on the web vary widely, and
even sites with stringent privacy poli-
cies are often lax about following them.
Further, web site operators with clear
policies on how their customer infor-
mation will be shared and monitored










banking.are often unaware of their alliance part-
ners’ privacy practices.
A focal point of the controversy is
the use of “cookies,” text files planted
by a web site on a visitor’s computer
hard drive. Cookies can convey to the
web site information about a computer
and its movements around the web
without the knowledge or consent of
the user.
In November 1999, the four federal
banking agencies reported that the ma-
jority (64 percent) of the 364 financial
institution web sites surveyed collected
personal information.
8 The items col-
lected most often were the consumer’s
name, e-mail address and postal ad-
dress. Thirty-eight percent of the institu-
tions that collected personal informa-
tion and 77 percent of those that did not
had not posted a privacy policy or in-
formation-practice statement.
The privacy issue is so sensitive that
it threatened to derail the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act, which was signed into
law last November. The financial serv-
ices modernization law contains a num-
ber of privacy provisions and gives fed-
eral banking regulators, the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission up to six
months to issue privacy regulations.
The Federal Reserve Board, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and
the Office of Thrift Supervision jointly
released a proposed rule on February
22. Regulation P, Privacy of Consumer Fi-
nancial Information, would apply to insti-
tutions regulated by the Federal Re-
serve. The proposed regulations that
would apply to other institutions are
substantively similar.
The privacy provisions of Gramm–
Leach–Bliley enable consumers to pre-
vent a financial institution from disclos-
ing nonpublic personal information to
unaffiliated third parties. The provisions
do not restrict the disclosure of such in-
formation among affiliated companies.
Under Gramm–Leach–Bliley, before
a financial institution can disclose non-
public personal information to a non-
affiliated third party for marketing and
certain other purposes, it must provide
a description of its privacy policies and
an opportunity for consumers to opt out
of the disclosure. In addition, a financial
institution must provide initial and an-
nual notices of its privacy policies to
consumers with whom it establishes a
customer relationship.
The Federal Reserve Board’s pro-
posed regulation implements the re-
quirements of Gramm–Leach–Bliley by
defining  “nonpublic personal informa-
tion,” “consumer” and “customer” and
by providing guidance on the timing of
notices and the means by which con-
sumers can exercise their opt-out rights.
Under the proposed rule, consumers
can opt out at any time. The proposed
regulation also contains other provi-
sions designed to clarify the require-
ments of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.
Public comments on the Board’s pro-
posal were due by March 31.
Expectations for privacy are far
greater on financial web sites than on
general e-commerce sites. Banks may
be in a unique position to overcome
negative customer perceptions and gain
a competitive advantage over nonbank
competitors by leveraging their public
trust and strong reputations through 
effective branding strategies.
A Melding of the Material
and Virtual Worlds
Advancing technology is driving Inter-
net banking, and it is relentless. Access
to the Internet is becoming ubiquitous,
no longer requiring a personal computer.
Handheld wireless organizers, kiosks and
interactive web television will soon be
common access devices. A new gener-
ation of mobile phones provides
Internet messaging and limited screen
capabilities. As the mass market adopts
these technologies, consumer demand
for 24-hour, remote, self-serve access to
personal financial information will push
even more banks online. The number
of households conducting banking trans-
actions over the Internet may reach 
32 million by 2003, according to Inter-
national Data Corp.
9
The Internet economy is forcing the
banking industry to embrace new tech-
nologies, develop new business prac-
tices and adopt new ways of thinking.
As a result, banks are entering untested
markets, forging novel alliances, gen-
erating additional revenue streams and
developing closer customer relationships.
From early indications, the banking in-
dustry, in its striking transformation, has
embarked on an extraordinary era.
— Karen Couch
Donna L. Parker
Couch is an analyst in the Financial
Industry Studies Department of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Parker 
is an examiner in the Banking Supervision
Department.  Notes
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TOCK MARKETS BEGAN the year
with a big divergence between
movements in the valuations of
so-called new economy and old
economy firms. Indeed, since the
New Year, the Dow Jones indus-
trial average of 30 major, estab-
lished stocks fell by around 14 percent,
whereas the Nasdaq stock index, which
contains many new economy firms,
jumped by nearly 25 percent (see Chart
1). Much of this split reflects a growing
belief among investors that the high-
tech revolution will cause a massive
shift in profitability away from older in-
dustries to the newer, high-tech sector.
While these changes in relative stock
prices may seem novel, shifts have oc-
curred during other periods of eco-
nomic transformation.
In fact, since the mid-1970s, the U.S
economy has undergone several waves
of restructuring as capital and labor
shifted from declining to growing in-
dustries in a process of creative de-
struction. Driving these changes are
fundamental factors, such as product in-
novations (for example, the personal
computer and the Internet), increased
foreign competition and dramatic price
developments (such as energy price
swings or inflation). In this process,
called the churn, the economy redirects
resources toward their most profitable
use, often resulting in a substantial
turnover among firms.
1
Accompanying the increased churn
on Main Street has been a faster
turnover among the leading stocks on
Wall Street. To a great extent, develop-
ments on Main Street affect Wall Street,
and vice versa. For example, innova-
tions in computer technology have driven
up the value of high-tech stocks, while
improvements in financial markets have
helped nurture the high-tech sector.
The stock market values (market
capitalizations) of different firms mirror
aspects of Main Street because stock
valuations embody the collective judg-
ment of many investors about the firms’
future profitability, growth and risk. As
new industries emerge and old ones
die, the relative stock market capitaliza-
tion of firms changes. In this way, cre-
ative destruction on Main Street shows
up on Wall Street.
This article relates shifts in the indus-
trial structure of the U.S. economy to
the churn among the leading stocks in
major stock indexes and exchanges. Al-
though creative destruction has led to
turnover in the leading American stocks
throughout the 20th century, the churn’s
pace has picked up in recent decades,
likely in response to increased turnover
of firms on Main Street.
2 Furthermore,
there are some interesting industrial
patterns in the financial churn. To illus-
trate these points, I review changes in
the most widely known American stock
index, the Dow Jones industrial aver-
age. I then shift to the broader Standard
& Poor’s Corp.’s market index of 500
stocks and the Nasdaq stock exchange.
I conclude with some suggestions about
the broad meaning of the stock market
churn and some practical implications
for policymakers and investors.
How the Dow Churns
One of the best available gauges of
stock market churn over the long haul
is the rate of change in the firms that
make up the Dow Jones industrial aver-
age. Charles H. Dow created this index
in 1896, using the average price of 12
leading stocks. Many of the original
companies produced farm goods and
were later replaced by rising manufac-
turing firms. Indeed, only one of the
original 12, General Electric Co.,
founded by Thomas Edison, is currently
in the index, largely because of its suc-
cess in transforming itself over the last
century. The Dow expanded to cover
20 stocks in 1916 and added 10 more in
1928, bringing the total to 30. Of these
30 companies, only three are still in the
index: General Electric, General Motors
Corp. and what is now Exxon Mobil
Corp. Over time, the Dow has increas-
ingly become more service and high-
tech oriented and less dominated by
heavy manufacturing and energy firms.
For example, since the mid-1980s, com-
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year-to-dateand Microsoft Corp. have replaced Dow
stalwarts such as Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., U.S. Steel and Texaco.
Much, but not all, of the turnover in
the Dow since 1928 occurred during the
Great Depression. Chart 2 plots the
number of Dow firms replaced in each
five-year period since 1930. The num-
ber of changes peaked in the early
1930s and then generally remained low
until the mid-1970s. Although some
changes were clumped together in the
late 1950s, the early post–World War II
period was an era of stability. Since the
mid-1970s, however, the Dow’s compo-
sition has changed at a faster pace, re-
flecting a more rapid churn in the U.S.
economy.
Prior to the last two economic ex-
pansions, there was a tendency for the
churn to be concentrated during down-
turns, such as the Great Depression and
the recessions of the late 1950s and late
1970s. More recently, however, we have
seen a fast churn during the last two
economic expansions. To some extent
this reflects the timing of the high-tech
revolution, exemplified by the addition
of Hewlett-Packard Corp., Intel and Mi-
crosoft to the Dow during the 1990s.
The faster churn may also stem
partly from steps taken to deregulate
the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. These actions, which fos-
tered greater competition and increased
foreign trade, allowed the natural churn
of the market system to operate during
good times, making it easier for the un-
employed to find new jobs. In this way,
our recent experience with free market
policies during the long expansions of
the 1980s and 1990s has helped us rec-
ognize what Cox and Alm call “the up-
side of downsizing.”
3
One drawback of tracking the Dow’s
composition is that firms in the index
are picked partly because they have
long track records that suggest they will
endure. As a result, it takes a long time
for a rising firm to enter the index. This
factor, plus the small number of stocks
in the Dow, limits the index’s ability 
to track the industrial mix of leading
stocks. This subject is better studied
using the S&P 500.
The Churning Leadership
of the S&P 500
Relative to the Dow, the S&P 500 is a
broader index of stocks that typically in-
cludes Dow components. The S&P 500
comprises 500 stocks whose breadth
and blue-chip characteristics have en-
couraged investors to use it for passive
index investing and as a benchmark for
judging the returns of individual stocks
or of actively managed portfolios. These
characteristics also make the top 10 U.S.
companies in the S&P 500 a good mir-
ror of the industrial mix of leading U.S.
firms.
4
For example, as shown in Chart 3,
four of the 10 most valuable firms in 1970
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7
Chart 3
Industry Composition of Top 10
S&P 500 Index Firms, 1970–99
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were manufacturers: General Motors, East-
man Kodak Co., General Electric and
Xerox Corp. Of the remainder, three were
oil producers, one was a retailer and
two—IBM Corp. and AT&T Corp.—
were early high-tech firms. By 1980, six
of the top 10 firms were in the energy
industry and only one and one-half were
heavy manufacturers (General Electric
was reclassified as half manufacturing
and half financial). This shift in indus-
trial mix reflected two factors. One was
the rise of foreign manufacturers, which
reduced the profitability and market
dominance of their U.S. counterparts.
The second was the increase in oil
prices, which boosted the value of oil
reserves and the returns to oil explora-
tion companies.
A decade later, however, only one
energy firm remained among the top 10
S&P 500. This reflected not only the
sharp decline of oil prices in the mid-
1980s but also the decade’s consump-
tion boom. By 1990, five of the top 10
companies produced light consumer
goods, including household products
maker Procter & Gamble Co. and food
industry giant Coca-Cola Co. The 1980s
consumer boom also propelled an in-
novative retailer, Wal-Mart Stores, into
the top 10 ranks of the S&P 500.
While consumer spending remained
strong in the 1990s, the mix of house-
hold and business purchases shifted in
response to the Information Revolution.
The rise of new information technolo-Page  8 Southwest Economy   March/April 2000
gies embodied in the personal com-
puter, Internet services and advanced
telecommunications devices has pro-
foundly affected both the structure of
the U.S. economy and relative stock
valuations. In fact, by the end of 1999,
five of the top 10 S&P 500 firms were
high-tech companies, up from only two
in 1990. (For a list of the current top 10
S&P 500 firms, see Table 1.)
There are some caveats in interpret-
ing the top 10 rankings. One is that
some changes in the industrial mix
partly reflect mergers. Another is that
the analysis focuses on U.S. firms. In
addition, shifts in the top 10 rankings
probably overstate the magnitude of
sales and employment shifts; neverthe-
less, changes in the top 10 ranks likely
reflect the direction of changing eco-
nomic fundamentals. Another drawback
of tracking these rankings is that the
S&P 500 contains mostly mature firms,
implying that it takes a long time before
newly rising companies are added. Ex-
amples include Microsoft, Intel and
Cisco Systems, which were only added
in the late 1990s even though they are
now among the index’s 10 most valu-
able firms. For this reason, the top S&P
500 stocks do not provide the most
timely picture of where the industrial
structure of the U.S. economy is headed
in the long run.
The Nasdaq and the Churn
Information about future industrial
trends is better reflected by the compo-
sition of the top stocks traded on the
Nasdaq. Unlike the Dow or S&P 500,
which are baskets or indexes of a fixed
number of stocks, the Nasdaq is a stock
exchange. It is an all-electronic ex-
change, with no physical trading floor
like the New York and American stock
exchanges. Of these three exchanges,
the Nasdaq is generally seen as having
the easiest requirements and standards
for firms to be listed. For this reason,
the Nasdaq more quickly lists risky, up-
start companies with high growth
prospects. As a result, the top Nasdaq
firms are more likely to reflect eco-
nomic trends, such as the rise of high-
tech products.
While one often hears the term
“tech-heavy Nasdaq” in press reports,
this description did not always apply.
As illustrated in Chart 4, seven of the
top 10 most valuable Nasdaq firms in
1976 were financial companies, reflect-
ing the combination of high inflation
and financial market innovation in the
1970s that boosted the value of non-
The more dramatic
rise of high-tech
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Transportationbank financial firms. Under these con-
ditions, businesses and households
sought financial investments that were
less battered by inflation than were
bank deposits, which suffered from
ceilings on deposit interest rates that
did not keep up with rising market in-
terest rates. As a result, nonbank finan-
cial firms gained market share from
banks and were important relative to
other companies in the growth-oriented
Nasdaq.
However, by 1980 three high-tech
firms rose to the top 10 as the personal
computer industry began to blossom.
This trend continued over the next 20
years. By 1990, six high-tech firms were
among the top 10 most valuable Nasdaq
companies, and by summer 1999 all of
the top 10 firms were high-tech con-
cerns (see Table 1). The more dramatic
rise of high-tech companies in the 
Nasdaq rankings relative to other ex-
changes or indexes largely stems from
the more open, upstart nature of this
exchange.
Conclusion
The dynamic nature of the U.S. econ-
omy is reflected not only in changing
employment or sales data but also in
the changing valuations of firms in the
stock market, where countless numbers
of investors assess the value of compa-
nies every day. In this sense, the churn
on Wall Street can be viewed as the flip
side of the churn on Main Street. Thus,
the stock market can provide useful in-
formation about the patterns of creative
destruction in the U.S. economy.
One example is the pace of change
in the composition of the Dow, which
has tracked the increased churn in the
U.S. economy during the last 25 years.
Another is the way the leading stocks 
in the S&P 500 reflect the evolving in-
dustrial structure of the economy. And,
although stock market data can be vola-
tile, some stock market information has
the advantage of being forward-looking,
unlike employment data, which tend 
to lag economic change, or sales data,
which tend to reflect current conditions.
In this regard, changes in the top 10
most valuable Nasdaq firms back in 
the early 1980s gave a good indication
of the high-tech revolution that greatly
restructured America’s economy in the
1990s. More generally, these three ex-
amples illustrate how the stock market
has reflected many of the broader eco-
nomic, political and cultural factors that
have been reshaping the U.S. and the
world.
The churn in the stock market also
has some practical implications for 
policymakers and investors. One is that
turnover among firms is the norm, not
the exception. What is the exception is
the period of stability among the lead-
ing stocks in the 20 or so years follow-
ing World War II. A second implication
is that such turnover poses some risks
for overly relying on a conventional
value approach to investing, in which
portfolios are overweighted in favor of
established, leading companies that
have low price-earnings ratios. And a
third is that investors could diversify
against the risks posed by stock market
churn by carefully investing some por-
tion of their portfolios in growth stocks,
some of which have the potential of 
becoming the blue-chip stocks of the
future.
—John V. Duca
Duca is a vice president in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.  Notes
1 The seminal book on the churn is Joseph A. Schumpeter’s Business
Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process, Vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939). For fur-
ther analysis, see W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “The Churn: The
Paradox of Progress,” 1992 Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
2 See W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “The Churn Among Firms: Re-
cycling America’s Corporate Elite,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Southwest Economy, Issue 1, January/February 1999, pp. 6–9.
3 See W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “The Upside of Downsizing,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, Issue 6, 
November/December 1996, pp. 7–11.
4 This point is emphasized in a recent article by E. S. Browning, “Will
Tech Stocks’ Surge End with the Decade?”  Wall Street Journal, 
August 23, 1999, pp. C1–2.
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HE RATE AT which foreign capi-
tal has been flowing into China
over the last decade has re-
ceived much attention. China is
now the second largest recipient
of foreign direct investment in
the world, after the United States. What
few observers appreciate is that despite
these announced capital inflows, China
is a net capital-exporting country. Most
interesting is that much of the net out-
flows are unreported in any normal
way. This oddity on China’s interna-
tional accounting books looks like
much more than just a statistical dis-
crepancy.
No one who applies the arithmetic of
balance of payments accounting would
be surprised that China is a net capital-
exporting country. That is not an odd-
ity. With respect to financial flows, what
is true of individuals is true of nations,
except that capital inflows and outflows
involve movements in foreign currency.
As an individual, if I spend more than I
earn, I must make up the difference by
borrowing—which is a capital inflow to
me. Likewise, if a country imports more
than it exports—buying more than it
sells—it is a matter of pure arithmetic
that the difference between the imports
and exports is made up by foreign cap-
ital inflows. Conversely, if I make more
than I spend, I must by definition be
saving. Something similar happens with
nations but is expressed a little differ-
ently. If a country exports more than it
imports, receiving more in foreign cur-
rency than it spends on foreign prod-
ucts, the difference must typically be
made up by capital outflows—outflows
of foreign currency.
Since China’s trade surplus is well
known, the likely direction of China’s
capital flows should be obvious. China’s
accounting and reporting of this impact,
however, is so irregular that it raises
many questions. China’s current account
—which records exports and imports of
goods and services—and its financial
and capital accounts—which are sup-
posed to specify legitimate capital in-
flows and outflows—are positive on
net. A look at Table 1 shows that in
most years between 1991 and 1998 the
positive foreign currency inflows under
the current account were accompanied
by positive foreign currency inflows
under the financial and capital accounts.
This is not how things are supposed to
work.
In tracking down capital flow oddi-
ties, however, we have to exhaust all
the normal accounting entries first.
There is one more common accounting
avenue that could be used when a cur-
rent account surplus is not offset by a 
financial and capital accounts deficit.
That outlet is reserves and related items,
a sort of savings account at the central
bank booked in foreign currency. When
a country runs a current account sur-
plus, it can legitimately accumulate for-
eign currency reserves, which it books
under reserves and related items. Coun-
tries with fixed exchange rates routinely
do this to accumulate the foreign re-
serves they need to maintain confi-
dence and to defend their currency
against speculative attacks if necessary.
As seen in Table 1, that is what hap-
pened most years during 1991–98. A
negative entry means foreign currency
is leaving the rest of the Chinese econ-
omy and becoming foreign currency re-
serves at the central bank.
Now that we have examined rela-
tions between the current account, the
financial and capital accounts, and the
reserves and related items, it is obvious
from Table 1 that everything is still not
accounted for and in balance. This brings
us to what is surprising and peculiar
about China’s capital flows. This final
avenue is the net errors and omissions
Capital In and Out of China
T
Chart 1
Net Capital Outflows under
Net Errors and Omissions







’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91
SOURCE: Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook,
1999, International Monetary Fund.
Table 1
China’s Balance of Payments, 1991–98
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Current account 13,272 6,401 –11,609 6,908 1,618 7,243 29,718 29,325
Financial and 8,032 –250 23,474 32,645 38,674 39,966 22,957 –6,323
capital accounts
Reserves and –14,537 2,060 –1,769 –30,453 –22,469 –31,705 –35,857 –6,248
related items
Net errors and –6,767 –8,211 –10,096 –9,100 –17,823 –15,504 –16,818 –16,754
omissions
SOURCE: Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1999, International Monetary Fund.
(Continued on page 12)Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” ( Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
November 1999–January 2000
Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1997 = 100
Texas Exports Continue to Bounce Back
Index, January 1997 = 100
Real dollars, January 2000
Real Oil Price
Percent
1.60 –.80 –.60 –.40 –.20 0 .20 .40 .60 .80 1.00 1.20 1.40
Average weekly hours –.08
Help-wanted index
Texas Stock Index
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HE TEXAS ECONOMY continues to rebound from
weakness in the first half of 1999, getting a healthy
boost from rising exports and energy prices. Recover-
ing Asian economies are benefiting manufacturing in-
dustries. Texas manufacturing employment rose 0.6
percent in January. Manufacturing jobs fell 2 percent
in 1999, the first employment drop since 1991. 
Oil prices doubled in the past year, rising to the highest lev-
els in nine years. On net, high oil prices benefit the Eleventh
District and are helping the energy industry recover from the
low oil prices of a year ago. Texas employment in mining and
oil and gas extraction has stabilized after falling over the past
two years. 
Although high oil prices are helping the energy industry,
drilling activity has been lackluster. As reported in the Beige
Book, the industry remains unimpressed by high oil prices
and is unwilling to take significant risks, choosing instead to
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI† Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
1/ 00 125.9 127.8 144.1 542.8 1,081.3 1,557.9 5,939.9 9,266.0 1,890.0 737.9
12/99 126.5 128.0 143.8 536.8 1,080.8 1,552.0 5,938.0 9,251.4 1,895.6 734.1
11/99 124.7 127.9 143.6 534.8 1,080.8 1,548.6 5,914.9 9,222.7 1,896.5 734.5
10/99 124.3 127.5 144.0 532.9 1,081.4 1,546.2 5,897.9 9,202.4 1,892.9 734.0
9/99 123.4 126.7 144.2 531.5 1,080.3 1,551.3 5,887.0 9,194.3 1,889.7 734.1
8/99 123.9 126.7 143.8 529.5 1,081.0 1,536.5 5,869.1 9,159.9 1,886.4 733.4
7/99 124.2 126.3 143.7 527.0 1,081.9 1,518.1 5,850.3 9,121.0 1,889.5 729.4
6/99 124.2 125.2 144.4 525.6 1,080.7 1,534.0 5,843.1 9,127.8 1,885.4 729.3
5/99 123.3 125.9 145.3 520.9 1,082.1 1,533.7 5,820.1 9,102.1 1,883.9 728.4
4/99 123.7 125.5 147.3 524.6 1,084.6 1,532.6 5,810.9 9,100.0 1,888.1 729.1
3/99 122.0 126.5 150.7 523.0 1,093.6 1,532.2 5,823.9 9,123.4 1,895.6 725.9
2/99 121.8 127.2 152.2 521.5 1,095.3 1,528.8 5,798.1 9,095.9 1,898.4 724.1
* in thousands
† Texas Industrial Production Index
 
pay down debt with the increased cash flow. One respondent
stressed the financial and psychological damage caused by oil
prices at $10 per barrel and said firms need to clean up their
financial problems before moving forward.
The Texas Leading Index declined slightly in January,
pulled down mostly by a drop in the stock price index. Be-
tween November 1999 and January 2000, seven components
of the index increased and only one—average hours
worked—showed weakness. Texas’ 1999 job growth was re-
cently revised down and now appears to incorporate more
negative effects from low oil prices. Data currently suggest
that Texas jobs grew more slowly in the first half of 1999 than
originally reported, ending the year up 1.9 percent. Job
growth this year will be stronger and, based on current infor-
mation, may exceed 2.5 percent.
—Fiona Sigalla
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entry, which is supposed to ac-
count for measurement errors,
generally small discrepancies, but
definitely does not for China. If the
net errors and omissions entry
were just a measurement error, the
size of the entry, whether positive
or negative, would not be far from
zero. Similarly, if this entry were
really just a discrepancy, we
would expect over time that the
positive and negative values
would cancel each other out. In
that case, the accumulated annual
balances under this item would
not show a persistent pattern. This,
in fact, is not only how the net er-
rors and omissions entries of most
industrial countries behave over
time but is how these entries typi-
cally behave for Asian developing
or newly industrialized countries.
China is the exception. From
1991 through 1998, the most re-
cent year for which data are avail-
able, China’s net errors and omis-
sions showed a net capital outflow
every year (see Chart 1). A positive
value one year did not offset a
negative value the next, as in other
countries. The cumulative net out-
flow over this period was $101.1
billion, nearly two-fifths of total
foreign direct investment in China.
What makes China’s net errors
and omissions particularly interest-
ing is that they are not measured
directly. The amounts are simply
what is left over after the differ-
ence between exports and imports
is accounted for by other, known,
capital flows. China imposes strict
foreign exchange and capital con-
trols. What causes these flows to
be concealed so much more than
in other countries? Political and
economic uncertainty? Mistrust of
the domestic financial system?
Taxes and tariffs? In any case, the
magnitude and persistence of this
entry at least give us an idea that
something large is going unmen-
tioned year in, year out.
—Dong Fu
Dong Fu is assistant economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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